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This paper concerns optimal redistributive income taxation and provision of a public input good in a two-type model with a minimum wage policy implemented for the low-ability type, where firms may use some of their resources for outsourcing by locating part of the production process abroad. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003791808
This paper concerns optimal redistributive income taxation and provision of a public input good in a two-type model with a minimum wage policy implemented for the low-ability type, where firms may outsource part of the production process abroad, and where outsourcing is substitutable for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003848572
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003904143
This paper concerns optimal redistributive income taxation and provision of a public input good in a two-type model with a minimum wage policy implemented for the low-ability type, where firms may outsource part of the production process abroad, and where outsourcing is substitutable for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013152608
This paper concerns optimal redistributive income taxation and provision of a public input good in a two-type model with a minimum wage policy implemented for the low-ability type, where firms may use some of their resources for outsourcing by locating part of the production process abroad. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012768264
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011402671
We study the socially optimal design of forest royalty and enforcement instruments in the case where concessions are allocated by a government, illegal logging incentives are present, and the government has available both area-based and value-based royalty instruments. When harvesters are risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001949089
We study the socially optimal design of forest royalty and enforcement instruments in the case where concessions are allocated by a government, illegal logging incentives are present, and the government has available both area-based and value-based royalty instruments. When harvesters are risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319466