oligopolywith capacity-constrained firms.Under two popular definitions of the uniform price, when each firm sets a price … corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this outcome. Even when firms may … collusion is attained with simple price-quantity strategies exhibiting capacity withholding. …

auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price … discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this outcome. We extend these results to the case … number of steps, maximal collusion is attained with simple price-quantity strategies exhibiting capacity withholding. …

This paper examines the feasibility of collusion in capacity constrained duopoly supergames. In each period firms … this price. Under price-quantity competition firms are able to ration their output below capacity. For a wide range of … capacity pairs, the equilibrium path providing the smaller firm with its highest stationary perfect equilibrium payoff requires …

With few exceptions, the literature on the role of capacity as a strategic entry deterrent has assumed Cournot … precommit to capacity levels before competing in price. Interesting deterrence effects arise because firms need time to build …, that is, cannot adjust capacity instantaneously in the post-entry game. This approach produces a simple and intuitive set …

auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price … discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case …

auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price … discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this outcome. We extend these results to the case … number of steps, maximal collusion is attained with simple price-quantity strategies exhibiting capacity withholding. …

in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules … discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this outcome. We extend these results to the case … number of steps, maximal collusion is attained with simple price-quantity strategies exhibiting capacity withholding. …