Showing 1 - 10 of 62
The paper studies the canonical hold-up problem with one-sided investment by the buyer and full ex post bargaining power by the seller. The buyer can covertly choose any distribution of valuations at a cost and privately observes her valuation. The main result shows that in contrast to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014482789
We consider a dynamic screening model where the agent may go bankrupt due to, for example, cash constraints. We model …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014476119
The paper studies the canonical hold-up problem with one-sided investment by the buyer and full ex post bargaining power by the seller. The buyer can covertly choose any distribution of valuations at a cost and privately observes her valuation. The main result shows that in contrast to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014492466
This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyersʼ valuations through an unobservable ex ante investment. The key insight is that the optimal mechanism may have the seller play a mixed investment strategy so as to create correlation between the buyersʼ otherwise...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042975
We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010402942
The paper extends the optimal delegation framework pioneered by Holmström (1977, 1984) to a dynamic environment where, at the outset, the agent privately knows his ability to interpret decision relevant private information received later on. We show that any mechanism can be implemented by a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198973
We introduce ex post participation constraints in the standard sequential screening model. This captures the presence …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010402944
This paper analyzes bilateral contracting in an environment with contractual incompleteness and asymmetric information. One party (the seller) makes an unverifiable quality choice and the other party (the buyer) has private information about its valuation. A simple exit option contract, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343931
This paper analyzes bilateral contracting in an environment with contractual incompleteness and asymmetric information. One party (the seller) makes an unverifiable quality choice and the other party (the buyer) has private information about its valuation. A simple exit option contract, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003798182
This paper formalizes the intuition that brands are consumed for image reasons and that advertising creates a brand's image. The key idea is that advertising informs the public of brand names and creates the possibility of conspicuous consumption by rendering brands a signalling device. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823363