as reduced remuneration and job loss. However, managers might over-invest into innovation for reasons of growth implying … their own interests. When entrenched, managers do not fear detrimental effects of risky innovation projects on their career …Principle-agent theory suggests managers might under-invest into R&D for reasons of risk tied to project failure, such …

as reduced remuneration and job loss. However, managers might over-invest into innovation for reasons of growth implying … their own interests. When entrenched, managers do not fear detrimental effects of risky innovation projects on their career …Principle-agent theory suggests managers might under-invest into R&D for reasons of risk tied to project failure, such …

as reduced remuneration and job loss. However, managers might over-invest into innovation for reasons of growth implying … their own interests. When entrenched, managers do not fear detrimental effects of risky innovation projects on their career …Principle-agent theory suggests managers might under-invest into R&D for reasons of risk tied to project failure, such …

innovation, i.e. weakly controlled managers show a higher innovation propensity. However, the higher the leverage the more … disciplined the managers are. …

This paper discusses theoretically the different incentives of managers versus firm owners to invest in innovative … managerled firms, expenditures on R&D depend on the control exerted. If capital shares are widely dispersed and managers are thus … only controlled a little by owners, they invest more into R&D. Owner-led firms and managers who are strongly controlled …

manager-led firms are more active innovators : the share of sales based on new products is larger if firms' managers do not …