The article is concerned with understanding the impact of social preferences and wealth inequality on aggregate economic outcomes. We investigate how different manifestations of other-regarding preferences affect incentive contracts at the microeconomic level and how these in turn translate into...

In many countries wages are set by collective agreements. Such agreements tend to impose wage equality among the a⁄ected workers. We use a moral-hazard environment with two inferiority-averse workers who di⁄er in their productivities but are otherwise identical. In this setting, we analyze...

In many countries, wages are set by collective agreements, which tend to impose standard wages across workers in the same sector and job. We analyze the impact of imposing such standard wages on labor market outcomes. We set the labor relationship in a moral-hazard environment where two...

The article is concerned with understanding the impact of social preferences and wealth inequality on aggregate economic outcomes. We investigate how different manifestations of other-regarding preferences affect incentive contracts at the microeconomic level and how these in turn translate into...

The article is concerned with understanding the impact of social preferences and wealth inequality on aggregate economic outcomes. We investigate how different manifestations of societal other-regarding preferences affect labor relationships and incentive contracts at the microeconomic level and...

The article is concerned with understanding the impact of social preferences on the optimal organizational design of firms. We consider a moral-hazard environment with inferiority averse workers. The integration of workers in one organizational unit yields productive complementarities but also...