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We study the relative efficiency of centralized versus decentralized organizational forms given optimized managerial performance evaluation within an incomplete contracting framework with risk‐averse agents under moral hazard. Decentralization and performance evaluation are complementary...
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We study the relative efficiency of centralized vs. decentralized organizational forms given optimized managerial performance evaluation within an incomplete contracting framework with risk-averse agents under moral hazard. Decentralization and performance evaluation are complementary control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014348930
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014456785
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