The philosophy of equilibrium refinements is that the analyst, if he knows things about the structure of the game, can reject some Nash equilibria as unreasonable. The word “know†in the preceding sentence deserves special emphasis. If in a fixed game the analyst can reject a...

This paper studies the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with long- and short-run players and little discounting. Because the short-run players are unconcerned about the future, each equilibrium outcome is constrained to lie on their static reaction (best-response) curves. The natural...

A decision maker faces an unobserved state of nature. She updates her prior on the state based on the realizations of a signal. In this note, we show that the expected posterior on any given state, taking expectation under the conditional distribution of the signal on this same state, is never...

The expected value of the log of a Bayesian’s posterior assessment of the true state of nature, computed under the probability law of the true state, is always at least as large as the log of the prior.