Why would the US threaten punitive tariffs on luxury autos to implement a market share target in auto parts? We show that by making threats to a linked market, a market share may be implemented with fairly weak informa- tional and administrative requirements. Moreover, such policies can be both...

This paper analyzes some aspects of the effects of trade restrictions (such as tariffs, quotas and quality controls) and their desirability when the quantity of the imported good is endogenous, and the foreign producer is a monopolist. It uses a fairly general model based on the work of Spence...

In a situation where tariff reforms are being negotiated between two parties, one of which aims to raise its exports and the other aims to raise its welfare, tariff cuts must be in the interest of at least one party. It is possible for the interests of the two sides to conflict. Conflict is...

In this paper we look at the welfare effects of trade reform in the many-consumers case. We show that Pareto-improving reforms with lump-sum taxation or with non-lump-sum taxation are possible in the small country case if sufficient conditions for welfare to rise in the single-consumer case are met