It is well known that the no-arbitrage condition in forward markets is obtained as a feature of the equilibrium if the model allows for strategic behavior on the part of the buyers. We experimentally test for the no-arbitrage condition in a forward market by allowing for active buyers. We test...

We test the strategic motive to sell forward in experimental Cournot duopoly and quadropoly environments with either a finite (exogenous close) or an infinite (endogenous close) number of forward markets. In the exogenous close case experienced subjects do not avail themselves of the forward...

We test the strategic motive to sell forward in experimental Cournot duopoly and quadropoly environments with multiple forward markets. Using random matching, we test two versions of forward markets with finite (Allaz and Vila, 1993) and indefinite number of periods. We find that the results for...

Strategic play requires that players in oligopolies be more sophisticated than in perfectly competitive markets. It thus seems reasonable to assume that player experience becomes important as the environment gets more complicated. We find that subject experience indeed plays an important role....