Recent corporate governance reforms focus on the board's independence and encourage equity ownership by directors. We analyze the efficacy of these reforms in a model in which both adverse selection and moral hazard exist at the level of the firm's management. Delegating governance to the board...

We examine optimal equity-based incentives for the Board of Directors (BOD) in a hierarchical agency framework. The underlying agency problem is due to a shareholder-manager conflict on investment policy. There is an endogenous demand for directors to monitor the quality of the firm's investment...

We present fresh evidence on the validity of the dividend signaling hypothesis (DSH), by using a new testing approach. We test the unambiguous prediction from the DSH that the association between current dividend changes and future profitability is stronger for firms with higher marginal net...

By addressing the interaction between security market microstructure and the generalized agency conflict between managers and shareholders, we study the effects of informed insider trading on productive efficiency, price discovery, and wealth redistribution. Insider trading can lead...

We examine voluntary disclosure and capital investment by an informed manager in an initial public offering (IPO) in the presence of informed and uninformed investors. We find that in equilibrium, disclosure is more forthcoming — and investment efficiency is lower — when a greater fraction...

We examine voluntary disclosure and capital investment by an informed manager in an initial public offering (IPO) in the presence of informed and uninformed investors. We find that in equilibrium, disclosure is more forthcoming — and investment efficiency is lower — when a greater fraction...

We study the choice of disclosure and share repurchase strategies of informed managers using a model that captures how they differentially impact short and long-term stock value. We identify a partial disclosure equilibrium in which firms in the lowest value region neither disclose nor...