In a financial intermediary, risk managers can expend effort to reduce loan probability of default and loss given default, but effort is unobservable. Incentive compensation (IC) can induce manager effort. When deposit insurance is subsidized, the demand for risk management declines. Regulatory...

New bank regulations include macroprudential policies to control bank loan growth. We find bank funding costs and supervisory monitoring intensity to be the most important determinants of loan growth followed by loan portfolio performance and bank profitability. Bank capital and liquidity ratios...

An emerging literature proposes using conditional value at risk and marginal expected shortfall to measure financial institution systemic risk. We identify two weaknesses in this literature: (1) it lacks formal statistical hypothesis tests; and, (2) it confounds systemic and systematic risk. We...

New bank regulations include macroprudential policies to control bank loan growth. We find bank funding costs and supervisory monitoring intensity to be the most important determinants of loan growth followed by loan portfolio performance and bank profitability. Bank capital and liquidity ratios...

An emerging literature proposes using conditional value at risk and marginal expected shortfall to measure financial institution systemic risk. We identify two weaknesses in this literature: (1) it lacks formal statistical hypothesis tests; and, (2) it confounds systemic and systematic risk. We...

In a financial intermediary, risk managers can expend effort to reduce loan probability of default and loss given default, but effort is unobservable. Incentive compensation (IC) can induce manager effort. When deposit insurance is subsidized, the demand for risk management declines. Regulatory...