We consider a representative-agent equilibrium model where the consumer has quasi-geometric discounting and cannot commit to future actions. With restricted attention to a parametric class for preferences and technology logarithmic utility, Cobb-Douglas production, and full depreciation we solve...

We consider a representative-agent equilibrium model where the consumer has quasi geometric discounting and cannot commit to future actions. We restrict attention to a parametric class for preferences and technology and solve for time-consistent competitive equilibria globally and explicitly. We...

We consider a representative-agent equilibrium model where the consumer has quasi-geometric discounting and cannot commit to future actions. With restricted attention to a parametric class for preferences and technology--logarithmic utility, Cobb-Douglas production, and full depreciaiton--we...

In this paper we attempt to (i) extend the competitive equilibrium neoclassical growth model to incorporate consumer preferences that are of the Gul-Pesendorfer variety; (ii) use the model to analyze taxation and welfare; and (iii) extend and specialize the Gul-Pesendorfer temptation formulation...

We analuze a general-equilibrium asset pricing model where a small subset of the consumers/investors have a short-run "urge to save." That is, their attitudetoward consumption in the long run is a standard one--they do place zero weight on consumption far enough out in the future--but their...

We analyze a general-equilibrium asset pricing model where a small subset of the consumers/investors have a short-run ldquo;urge to saverdquo;. That is, their attitude toward consumption in the long run is a standard one they do place zero weight on consumption far enough out in the future but...

We consider a representative-agent equilibrium model where the consumer has quasi-geometric discounting and cannot commit to future actions. We restrict attention to a parametric class for preferences and technology and solve for time-consistent competitive equilibria globally and explicitly. We...

We study optimal taxation when consumers have temptation and self-control problems. Embedding the class of preferences developed by Gul and Pesendorfer into a standard macroeconomic setting, we first prove, in a two-period model, that the optimal policy is to subsidize savings when consumers...