Similar Search Results

Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics

Balkenborg, Dieter; Hofbauer, Josef; Kuzmics, Christoph - 2011

We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy profiles, a generalized best reply correspondence if it has (1) a product structure, is (2) upper semi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy profile, and is (4) convex- and closed-valued. For each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009231404

The Refined Best Reply Correspondence and Backward Induction

Balkenborg, Dieter - 2016

Fixed points of the (most) refined best reply correspondence, introduced in Balkenborg, Hofbauer, and Kuzmics (2013), in the agent normal form of extensive form games with perfect recall have a remarkable property. They induce fixed points of the same correspondence in the agent normal form of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012983536

Refined Best-Response Correspondence and Dynamics

Balkenborg, Dieter - 2011

We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy profiles, a generalized best-reply correspondence if it has (1) a product structure, is (2) upper hemi--continuous, (3) always includes a best-reply to any mixed strategy profile, and is (4) convex- and closed-valued. For each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012714296

Refined Best Reply Correspondence and Dynamics

Balkenborg, Dieter - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013037056

Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics

Balkenborg, Dieter; Hofbauer, Josef; Kuzmics, Christoph - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 8 (2013) 1, pp. 165-192

We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy pro les, a generalized best reply correspondence if it (1) has a product structure, (2) is upper hemi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy pro le, and (4) is convex- and closed-valued. For each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011687048

Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values

Heller, Yuval; Kuzmics, Christoph - 2021

An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We … characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over … the feasible coordinated outcomes. Communication-proof equilibria provide a narrow selection from the large set of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013210917

Coordination with independent private values: Why pedestrians sometimes bump into each other

Kuzmics, Christoph - 2014

Motivated by trying to better understand the norms that govern pedestrian traffic, I study symmetric two-player coordination games with independent private values. The strategies of always pass on the left and always pass on the right are always equilibria of this game. Some such games, however,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352832

Cognitive empathy in conflict situations

Gauer, Florian; Kuzmics, Christoph - 2016

Two individuals are involved in a conflict situation in which preferences are ex ante uncertain. While they eventually learn their own preferences, they have to pay a small cost if they want to learn their opponent's preferences. We show that, for sufficiently small positive costs of information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011582517

Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics

Kuzmics, Christoph; Balkenborg, Dieter; Hofbauer, Josef - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 1, pp. 165-192

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599479

Coordination with Independent Private Values: why Pedestrians sometimes bump into each other

Kuzmics, Christoph - 2014

Motivated by trying to better understand the norms that govern pedestrian traffic, I study symmetric two-player coordination games with independent private values. The strategies of "always pass on the left" and "always pass on the right" are always equilibria of this game. Some such games,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010396959

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Next
Last