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<I>Abstract</I><p> See document.<p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209454
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions (possibly empty or consisting of a unique element) to every...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209512
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many such allocation problems, such as river games, queueing games and auction games, the game is totally positive (i.e., all dividends are nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016260
Tucker's well-known combinatorial lemma states that for any given symmetric triangulation of the n-dimensional unit cube and for any integer labeling that assigns to each vertex of the triangulation a label from the set {1,2,...n,-1,-2,....-n} with the property that antipodal vertices on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144416
We study how players in a local interaction hawk dove game will learn, if they can either imitate the most succesful player in the neighborhood or play a best reply versus the opponent's previous action. From simulations it appears that each learning strategy will be used, because each performs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144431
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144441
In a standard general equilibrium model it is assumed that there are no price restictions and that prices adjust infinitely fast to their equilibrium values. In this paper the set of admissible prices is allowed to be an arbitrary convex set. For such an arbitrary set it cannot be guaranteed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144447
This paper associates a strategic <I>n</I>-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash equilibria. Strict equilibria in this model characterize those divisions of social surplus that can become conventions in the sense of Young (1993). It is shown that even in relatively...</i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144450
It is widely recognized that the shape of networks influences both individual and aggregate behavior. This raises the question which types of networks are likely to arise. Our paper fits into the literature that addresses this question. The paper continues on the work of Galeotti, Goyal and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144472
We introduce a new solution for bankruptcy problems that satisfies weaker versions of the Exemption en Exclusion properties from the literature. Although the principles of Exclusion and Exemption are appealing, the specific conditions under which an agent receives its claim, respectively...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144490