well known refinements of the Nash equilibrium, namely, perfect Nash equilibrium and proper Nash equilibrium, are special … Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for every game. In symmetric bimatrix games, our results imply the existence of a … symmetric proper equilibrium. Applying our results to the field of evolutionary game theory yields a refinement of the …

In a standard general equilibrium model it is assumed that there are no price restictionsand that prices adjust … infinitely fast to their equilibrium values. In this paper the set ofadmissible prices is allowed to be an arbitrary convex set …. For such an arbitrary set it cannotbe guaranteed that there exists a constrained equilibrium satisfying the usual …

first show that two well known refinements of the Nash equilibrium, namely, perfect Nash equilibrium and proper Nash … equilibrium, are special cases of our robustness concept. Further, a third special case of robustness refines the concept of … properness and a robust Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for every game. In symmetric bimatrix games, our results imply the …

In a standard general equilibrium model it is assumed that there are no price restictions and that prices adjust … infinitely fast to their equilibrium values. In this paper the set of admissible prices is allowed to be an arbitrary convex set …. For such an arbitrary set it cannot be guaranteed that there exists a constrained equilibrium satisfying the usual …

show that two well known refinements of the Nash equilibrium, namely, perfect Nash equilibrium and proper Nash equilibrium … and a robust Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for every game. In symmetric bimatrix games, our results imply the … existence of a symmetric proper equilibrium. Applying our results to the field of evolutionary game theory yields a refinement …