Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 75
Cover Image
Network Competition : Ii. Price Discrimination
Laffont, Jean-Jacques; Rey, Patrick; Tirole, Jean - 1998
Our companion article developed a clear conceptual framework of negotiated or regulated interconnection agreements between rival operators and studied competition between interconnected networks, under the assumption of non-discriminatory pricing. This article relaxes this assumption and allows...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014074125
Cover Image
Internet Interconnection and the Off-Net-Cost Pricing Principle
Laffont, Jean-Jacques; Marcus, J. Scott; Rey, Patrick; … - 2014
The paper develops a framework for Internet backbone competition. In the absence of direct payments between websites and consumers, the access charge allocates communication costs between websites and consumers and affects the volume of traffic. The paper analyzes the impact of the access charge...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014105697
Cover Image
On the Receiver Pays Principle
Jeon, Doh-Shin; Laffont, Jean-Jacques; Tirole, Jean - 2003
This paper extends the theory of network competition between telecommunications operators by allowing receivers to derive a surplus from receiving calls (call externality) and to affect the volume of communications by hanging up (receiver sovereignty). We investigate the extent to which receiver...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014117100
Cover Image
A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs
Faure-Grimaud, Antoine; Laffont, Jean-Jacques; … - In: Annals of Economics and Finance 1 (2000) 2, pp. 231-263
We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principal delegates part of his authority to a supervisor who can acquire soft information about an agent's productivity. If the supervisor were risk-neutral, the principal would simply make the better informed supervisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009131591
Cover Image
A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs
Faure-Grimaud, Antoine; Laffont, Jean-Jacques; … - China Economics and Management Academy, Central … - 1999
We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principal delegates part of his authority to a supervisor who can acquire soft information about an agent's productivity. If the supervisor were risk-neutral, the principal would simply make the better informed supervisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009150759
Cover Image
A theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs
Faure-Grimaud, Antoine; Laffont, Jean-Jacques; … - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998
We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principal delegates part of his authority to a supervisor who can acquire soft information about an agent's productivity. If the supervisor were risk-neutral, the principal would simply make the better informed supervisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928775
Cover Image
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation
Laffont, Jean-Jacques; Tirole, Jean - The MIT Press
More then just a textbook, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation will guide economists' research on … regulation for years to come. It makes a difficult and large literature of the new regulatory economics accessible to the average … pathbreaking work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004973067
Cover Image
Downsizing with Labor Sharing and Collusion
Laffont, Jean-Jacques; Estache, Antonio; Zhang, Xinshu - Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse … - 2003
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596996
Cover Image
Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
Faure-Grimaud, Antoine; Laffont, Jean-Jacques; … - Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse … - 2003
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005597088
Cover Image
A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs
Faure-Grimaud, Antoine; Laffont, Jean-Jacques; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998
We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principle delegates part of his authority to a supervisor who can acquire soft information about an agent's productivity. If the supervisor were risk-neutral, the principal would simply make the better informed supervisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114332