We modify the vertically differentiated duopoly model by André et al. (2009) replacing Bertrand with Cournot behaviour to show that firms may spontaneously adopt a green technology even in the complete absence of any form of regulation.

We revisit Fujiwara's (2008) differential duopoly game to show that the degenerate nonlinear feedback identified by the tangency point with the stationary state line is indeed unstable, given the dynamics of the natural resource exploited by firms. To do so, we fully characterise the continuum...

We model a vertically differentiated duopoly with quantity-setting fi rms as an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage, to show that at the subgame perfect equilibrium sequential play obtains, with the low-quality firm taking the leader's role

We model a vertically differentiated duopoly with quantity-setting firms as an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage, to show that at the subgame perfect equilibrium sequential play obtains, with the low-quality firm taking the leaders role.

In markets where product quality is important, more than one characteristic is usually necessary to de fine product quality. Standard models maintain that: (i) in a duopoly there will be a quality leader no matter whether the product can incorporate one or two vertical attributes; (ii)...

We revisit Fujiwaraís (2008) differential duopoly game to show that the degenerate nonlinear feedback identified by the tangency point with the stationary state line is indeed unstable, given the dynamics of the natural resource exploited by firms. To do so, we fully characterise the continuum...