In this note we revisit the result by Menezes and Quiggin (2012), showing that under linear supply function competition …, the same Nash equilibrium results when arms choose slopes or intercepts of their supply functions. This is because the …

We show that supply functions cannot be classified as either strategic complements or substitutes according to the … and strengthen our result by proving that the game in supply functions is neither supermodular nor submodular. …

competition and Cournot conjectures; and (ii) supply function competition with ex post market clearing. We demonstrate both …

We show that the standard argument according to which supply function equilibria rank intermediate between Bertrand and … Cournot equilibria may be reversed. We prove this result within a static oligopolistic game in which both supply function … supply function equilibrium. Such reversal of the typical ranking occurs when price-setting mimics collusion. We then show …

We investigate an extended game with observable delay under duopolistic competition in affine supply functions. Firms … use the intercepts of supply functions as their strategic variables. Best replies are downward (upward) sloping if the … common slope of supply functions is sufficiently low (high). Accordingly, simultaneous (sequential) play is selected at the …

competition and Cournot conjectures; and (ii) supply function competition with ex post market clearing. We demonstrate both …

In this paper we verify the functioning of the standard neoclassical adjustment to equilibrium after a demand shock in … guaranteed. We show that the size of the demand shock determines the nature and number of equilibria generated by strategic …