Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 476
Cover Image
Collusive vertical relations
Bolatto, Stefano; Lambertini, Luca - 2017
We investigate the possibility for two vertically related firms to at least partially collude on the wholesale price over an in.nite horizon to mitigate or eliminate the e¤ects of double marginalisation, thereby avoiding contracts which might not be enforceable. We characterise alternative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674459
Cover Image
Collusive Vertical Relations
Bolatto, Stefano - 2017
We investigate the possibility for two vertically related firms to at least partially collude on the wholesale price over an infinite horizon to mitigate or eliminate the effects of double marginalisation, thereby avoiding contracts which might not be enforceable. We characterise alternative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012952833
Cover Image
Efficient horizontal mergers in polluting industries with Cournot competition
Lambertini, Luca; Tampieri, Alessandro - 2012
We compare a Bertrand with a Cournot duopoly in a setting where production is polluting and exploits natural resources, and firms bear convex production costs. We adopt Dastidar's (1995) approach, yielding a continuum of Bertrand-Nash equilibria ranging above marginal cost pricing also, to show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011734236
Cover Image
Efficient Horizontal Mergers in Polluting Industries with Cournot Competition
Lambertini, Luca - 2012
We investigate the feasibility of horizontal mergers in a homogeneous triopoly where firms compete in quantities and production is polluting the environment. We show that the degree of alignment between private and social incentives increases in the intensity of pollution
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013110410
Cover Image
Horizontal mergers with capital adjustments : workers' cooperatives and the merger paradox
Delbono, Flavio; Lambertini, Luca - 2014
maximisers. Within a simple oligopoly model, we prove that the horizontal merger, for any merger size, is: (i) privately …We study the incentives towards horizontal merger among firms when the amount of capital is the strategic variable. The … merger to monopoly. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011729071
Cover Image
Horizontal Mergers with Capital Adjustment : Workers' Cooperatives and the Merger Paradox
Delbono, Flavio - 2014
simple oligopoly model, we prove that the horizontal merger, for any merger size, is: (i) privately efficient for insiders as …We study the incentives towards horizontal merger among firms when the amount of capital is the strategic variable. We … well as for outsiders; (ii) socially efficient if market size is large enough, even in the case of merger to monopoly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013047749
Cover Image
On the feedback solutions of differential oligopoly games with hyperbolic demand curve and capacity accumulation
Lambertini, Luca; Palestini, Arsen - 2013
under both circumstances. Static profitability of a merger implies dynamic profitability of the same merger. It appears that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011731041
Cover Image
On the feedback solution of a differential oligopoly game with hyperbolic demand and capacity accumulation
Lambertini, Luca - 2010
analyse the feasibility of horizontal mergers, and compare the result generated by the dynamic setup with the merger incentive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011739873
Cover Image
Market power, resource extraction and pollution : some paradoxes and a unified view
Lambertini, Luca; Leitmann, George - 2011
We adopt a stepwise approach to the analysis of a dynamic oligopoly game in which production makes use of a natural …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011735092
Cover Image
Bertrand versus Cournot with convex variable costs
Delbono, Flavio; Lambertini, Luca - 2015
Within a simple model of homogeneous oligopoly, we show that the traditional ranking between Bertrand and Cournot …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011715895