This article investigates the policy active importers' incentives and welfare implications of using production and trade policies in a dynamic framework where production decisions occur before consumption decisions. We show that the equilibrium for production taxes and quotas are not equivalent,...

Tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) have replaced quotas at the end of the Uruguay Round. We analyze TRQs when a foreign firm competes against a domestic firm in the latter’s market. Our benchmark is the strategic rent-shifting tariff. We show that the domestic price-equivalent TRQ is a better...

This paper investigates the strategic behavior between countries that have purchasing power on the world market for a certain good. Tariffs and quotas are not equivalent protection instruments in this oligopsonistic market. Policy active importers would be better off by colluding and setting...

Tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) have replaced quotas at the end of the Uruguay Round. We analyze TRQs when a foreign firm competes against a domestic firm in the latter’s market. Our benchmark is the strategic rent-shifting tariff. We show that the domestic price-equivalent TRQ is a better...

We use a standard general equilibrium trade model to show that export and import policies are not symmetric in the equilibrium of a strategic game with quotas. We assume N (identical) large countries non-cooperatively set their import (or export) quotas to maximize domestic welfare. We show that...

We investigate the strategic behavior between exporting countries that face endogenous terms of trade on the world market. In a non-cooperative setting, if production decisions occur before consumption decisions, the ex-ante optimal export quota is not time consistent as the ex-post elasticity...

Multilateral negotiations on agriculture in the WTO are making very little progress as developed economies are reluctant to bind trade-distorting domestic support and import tariffs at levels acceptable to developing countries. This paper presents the basic Bagwell-Staiger framework as it...

This paper endogenizes the choice between import tariffs and quotas of two policy active countries in a duopsonistic world market. Without uncertainty, import quotas are welfare superior to import tariffs in equilibrium. If two importers can precommit to a type of instrument before deciding the...