There are at least three potential ways in which a CEO divorce might impact a corporation and its shareholders. First, it might reduce the executive's control or influence over the organization. Second, it might affect his or her productivity, concentration, and energy levels. Third, it can...

Corporate governance systems exist to discourage self-interested behavior. One question that is often overlooked is how extensive these systems should be. A look at corporate governance today suggests that self-interest is high because companies are compelled - by regulators and the market - to...

We examine whether board and ownership structure variables explain the level of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. After controlling for standard economic determinants (i.e., the firm's demand for a high-quality CEO, firm performance, and risk), we find that board and ownership...

In this Closer Look, we consider current trends in shareholder activism and their potential impact. We examine the introduction of universal proxies, the increase in “activism experience” among directors, and the changing strategies of activists. With the regulatory and market environments...

Stock and option compensation and the level of managerial equity incentives are aspects of corporate governance that are especially controversial to shareholders, institutional activists, and government regulators. Similar to much of the corporate finance and corporate governance literature,...