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The incentives for tax planning
Armstrong, Christopher; Blouin, Jennifer L.; Larcker, … - 2011 - Draft: March 8, 2011
We use a proprietary data set with detailed executive compensation information to examine the relationship between the incentives of the tax director and GAAP and cash effective tax rates, the book-tax gap, and measures of tax aggressiveness. We find that the incentive compensation of the tax...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506609
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Peer group choice and chief executive officer compensation
Larcker, David F.; McClure, Charles; Zhu, Christina - 2019 - Draft: August 22, 2019
We examine the selection of peer groups that boards of directors use when setting CEO compensation. The challenge is to ascertain whether peer groups are selected to (i) attract and retain executive talent and/or (ii) enable rent extraction by inappropriately increasing compensation. We find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012065171
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Stock options and chief executive officer compensation
Armstrong, Christopher (contributor);  … - 2007
Although stock options are commonly observed in chief executive o±cer (CEO) compensation contracts, there is theoretical controversy about whether stock options are part of the optimal contract. Using a sample of Fortune 500 companies, we solve an agency model calibrated to the company-specific...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782064
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CEO pay at valeant : does extreme compensation create extreme risk?
Larcker, David F.; Tayan, Brian - 2016
The litmus test for an effective compensation program is whether it provides “pay for performance.” While the concept of pay for performance is simple, its implementation is not. In particular, boards must consider not only whether a compensation plan encourages executives to pursue...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864729
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Endogenous Selection and Moral Hazard in Executive Compensation Contracts
Armstrong, Chris - 2012
The two major paradigmsin the theoretical agency literature aremoral hazard (i.e., hidden action)and adverseselection (i.e., hiddeninformation). Prior research typically solves these problemsin isolation, as opposed to simultaneouslyincorporating both adverseselection and moral hazard features....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116385
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The Structure and Performance Consequences of Equity Grants to Employees of New Economy Firms
Ittner, Christopher D.; Lambert, Richard A.; Larcker, … - 2011
-level managers, and non-exempt employees of "new economy" firms. We find that many of the equity grant determinants and their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014034329
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The Structure and Performance Consequences of Equity Grants to Employees of New Economy Firms
Ittner, Christopher D.; Lambert, Richard A.; Larcker, … - 2011
-level managers, and non-exempt employees of "new economy" firms. We find that the determinants of equity grants are significantly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014031220
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The relation between equity incentives and misreporting: The role of risk-taking incentives
Armstrong, Christopher S.; Larcker, David F.; … - In: Journal of Financial Economics 109 (2013) 2, pp. 327-350
, the sensitivity of the manager׳s wealth to changes in stock price (portfolio delta) will have two countervailing incentive … effects: a positive “reward effect” and a negative “risk effect.” In contrast, the sensitivity of the manager׳s wealth to … by vega subsume those of delta. Collectively, our results suggest that equity portfolios provide managers with incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011039247
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The Relation between Equity Incentives and Misreporting: The Role of Risk-Taking Incentives
Armstrong, Christopher S.; Larcker, David F.; … - Graduate School of Business, Stanford University - 2012
provide managers with incentives to misreport when they make managers less averse to equity risk. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010592147
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Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities
Armstrong, Chris - 2012
This study examines whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity-based holdings and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports. While several prior studies have examined this important question, the empirical evidence is mixed and the existence of a link between CEO equity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012755181