This paper develops a four-sector equilibrium search and matching model with informal sector employment opportunities and educational choice. We show that underground activities reduce educational attainments if informal employment opportunities mainly are available for low-educated workers. A...

To examine the macro economic effects of government tax and punishment policies, this paper develops a three-sector general quilibrium model featuring matching frictions, heterogenous abilities and an informal sector with tax evasion. The choice of education is determined endogenously. Job...

While examining the macroeconomic effects of government tax and punishment policies, this paper develops a three-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargaining. Workers are assumed to differ in ability, and the choice of education is determined...

While examining the macroeconomic effects of increased government <p> control of the informal sector, this paper develops a two-sector general <p> equilibrium model featuring matching frictions on the labour market and <p> a social norm. Conducting informal work, or employing a worker infor- <p> mally, is...</p></p></p></p>

While examining the macroeconomic effects of increased government control of the informal sector, this paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargaining. Workers search for jobs in both the formal and the informal sector. We...

While examining the macroeconomic effects of government tax and punishment policies, this paper develops a three-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargaining. Workers are assumed to differ in ability, and the choice of education is determined...

This paper develops a four-sector equilibrium search and matching model with informal sector employment opportunities and educational choice. We show that underground activities reduce educational attainments if informal employment opportunities mainly are available for low-educated workers. A...

This paper develops a general equilibrium search and matching model where an underground economy co-exists along with the formal part of the economy. In analyzing how tax and punishment policies a¤ect labour market performance, we nd that punishment of infor- mal sector activities induce...

While examining the macroeconomic effects of increased government control of the informal sector, this paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargaining. Workers search for jobs in both the formal and the informal sector. We...

To examine the macro economic effects of government tax and punishment policies, this paper develops a three-sector general quilibrium model featuring matching frictions, heterogenous abilities and an informal sector with tax evasion. The choice of education is determined endogenously. Job...