Showing 1 - 10 of 17
This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320343
Leniency policies and rewards for whistleblowers are being introduced in ever more fields of law enforcement, though their deterrence effects are often hard to observe, and the likely effect of changes in the specific features of these schemes can only be observed experimentally. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281230
In this paper we investigate the effects of risk preferences and attitudes towards risk on optimal antitrust enforcement policies. First, we observe that risk aversion is negatively correlated with players' proclivity to form a cartel, and that increasing the level of fines while reducing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281419
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003880040
In this paper we investigate the effects of risk preferences and attitudes towards risk on optimal antitrust enforcement policies. First, we observe that risk aversion is negatively correlated with players' proclivity to form a cartel, and that increasing the level of fines while reducing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003666286
Leniency policies and rewards for whistleblowers are being introduced in ever more fields of law enforcement, though their deterrence effects are often hard to observe, and the likely effect of changes in the specific features of these schemes can only be observed experimentally. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003666289
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578856
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009618548
We present results from a laboratory experiment identifying the main channels through which different law enforcement strategies deter organized economic crime. The absolute level of a fine has a strong deterrence effect, even when the exogenous probability of apprehension is zero. This effect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008934039
This paper reports results from an experiment studying how nes, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly nes as (altruistic) punishments....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003736705