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Interpersonal consistency can be described in epistemic terms as a property of beliefs, or in economic terms as the impossibility of certain trades. The existence of a common prior from which all agentsʼ beliefs are derived is of the first kind. The non-existence of an agreeable bet, that is, a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049902
Aumann has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event $E$ if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event $E$, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for $E$...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599446
Real world players often increase their payoþs by voluntarily committing to play a .xed strategy, prior to the start of a strategic game. In fact, the players may further bene.t from commitments that are conditional on the commitments of others. This paper proposes a model of conditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266312
Aumann has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event $E$ if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event $E$, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for $E$...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008490388
Real world players often increase their payoffs by voluntarily committing to play a fixed strategy, prior to the start of a strategic game. In fact, the players may further benefit from commitments that are conditional on the commitments of others. This paper proposes a model of conditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008494982
Aumann(1976) has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event E if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event E, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for E *do*...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550922
Aumann has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event $E$ if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event $E$, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for $E$...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694981
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383984
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009160968
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008656816