The term "rent-dissipation" is prominently used in the theory of rent-seeking and its (game) theoretical vehicle contest theory. While in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of a contest with finitely many players full rent-dissipation cannot occur, this is not the case if the same contests are...

The term "rent-dissipation" is prominently used in the theory of rent-seeking and its (game) theoretical vehicle contest theory. While in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of a contest with finitely many players full rent-dissipation cannot occur, this is not the case if the same contests are...

It is a very well-known result that in terms of evolutionary stability the long-run outcome of a Cournot oligopoly market with finitely many firms approaches the perfectly competitive Walrasian market outcome (Vega-Redondo, 1997). However, in this paper we show that an asymmetric structure in...

It is a very well-known result that in terms of evolutionary stability the long-run outcome of a Cournot oligopoly market with finitely many firms approaches the perfectly competitive Walrasian market outcome (Vega-Redondo, 1997). However, in this paper we show that an asymmetric structure in...

It is a very well-known result that in terms of evolutionary stability the long-run outcome of a Cournot oligopoly market with finitely many firms approaches the perfectly competitive Walrasian market outcome (Vega-Redondo, 1997). However, in this paper we show that an asymmetric structure in...