This Paper starts from the result of Rochet (1989), that with distortionary income taxes social insurance is a desirable redistributive device when risk and ability are negatively correlated. This finding is re-examined when ex post moral hazard and adverse selection are included, and under...

<link rid="b14">Rochet (1991)</link> showed that with distortionary income taxes, social insurance is a desirable redistributive device when risk and ability are negatively correlated. This finding is re-examined when "ex post" moral hazard and adverse selection are included, and under different informational...

This paper studies optimal linear income taxation and redistributive social insurance when the former has the traditional labor distortion and the latter generates both ex ante and ex post moral hazard. Private insurance is available and individuals differ in labor productivity and in loss...

This paper studies optimal linear income taxation and redistributive social insurance when the former has the traditional labor distortion and the latter generates both ex ante and ex post moral hazard. Private insurance is available and individuals differ in labor productivity and in loss...