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The unexpected behavior of plurality rule
Gehrlein, William V.; Lepelley, Dominique - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 67 (2009) 3, pp. 267-293
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003886688
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Voting paradoxes and group coherence : the condorcet efficiency of voting rules
Gehrlein, William V.; Lepelley, Dominique - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008749576
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Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election?
Gehrlein, William V.; Lepelley, Dominique; Plassmann, … - In: Social choice and welfare 46 (2016) 4, pp. 707-747
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011452565
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Strong condorcet efficiency of scoring rules
Lepelley, Dominique; Gehrlein, William V. - In: Economics letters 68 (2000) 2, pp. 157-164
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001485055
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The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters
Gehrlein, William V.; Lepelley, Dominique - In: Mathematical social sciences 41 (2001) 1, pp. 39-50
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001545780
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Scoring rules, condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity
Lepelley, Dominique; Pierron, Patrick; Valognes, Fabrice - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 49 (2000) 2, pp. 175-196
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001517930
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Condorcet efficiencies under the maximal culture condition
Gehrlein, William V.; Lepelley, Dominique - In: Social choice and welfare 16 (1999) 3, pp. 471-490
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001391347
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Condorcet's paradox for weak preference orderings
Lepelley, Dominique; Martin, Mathieu - In: European journal of political economy 17 (2001) 1, pp. 163-177
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001560550
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The likelihood of a condorcet winner in the logrolling setting
Gehrlein, William V.; Le Breton, Michel; Lepelley, Dominique - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012221253
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Condorcet Efficiencies Under the Maximal Culture Condition
Gehrlein, William V.; Lepelley, Dominique - 1999
The Condorcet winner in an election is a candidate that could defeat each other candidate in a series of pairwise majority rule elections. The Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is the conditional probability that the voting rule will elect the Condorcet winner, given that such a winner...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014193107