education spending and teacher salaries falls when respondents receive information about existing levels. Treatment effects vary … by prior knowledge in a manner consistent with information effects rather than priming. Support for salary increases is …' lower support for increases. Information about the tradeoffs between specific spending categories shifts preferences from …

education spending and teacher salaries falls when respondents receive information about existing levels. Treatment effects vary … by prior knowledge in a manner consistent with information effects rather than priming. Support for salary increases is …' lower support for increases. Information about the tradeoffs between specific spending categories shifts preferences from …

comparative evidence on public preferences for education spending, we conduct representative experiments with information …, providing information about actual spending and salary levels reduces support for increased education spending from 54 to 40 … preferences are similar across the three countries when the role of status-quo and information are taken into account. …

comparative evidence on public preferences for education spending, we conduct representative experiments with information …, providing information about actual spending and salary levels reduces support for increased education spending from 54 to 40 … preferences are similar across the three countries when the role of status-quo and information are taken into account. …

care enrollment. In an RCT in Germany with highly subsidized child care (N = 607), we offer treated families information …

misperceive the performance of their state's education system. Experimentally providing performance information polarizes citizens …' educational performance. Parliamentarians' support for the transparency policy is opportunistic: Performance information increases … educational performance information may incentivize politicians to implement welfare-enhancing reforms. …

performance of their state's education system. Experimentally providing performance information polarizes citizens' political … performance. Parliamentarians' support for the transparency policy is opportunistic: Performance information increases (decreases … performance information may incentivize politicians to implement welfareenhancing reforms. …

misperceive the performance of their state's education system. Experimentally providing performance information polarizes citizens …' educational performance. Parliamentarians' support for the transparency policy is opportunistic: Performance information increases … educational performance information may incentivize politicians to implement welfare-enhancing reforms. …