The paper uses a real option approach to investigate the impact of performance-based risk-sharing agreements for the reimbursement of new drugs in comparison with standard cost-effectiveness thresholds. The results show that the exact definition of the risk-sharing agreement is key in...

In this article we analyse the problem of determining the price for new drugs in a market where a stringent budget constraint on public expenditure exists and we suggest an innovative methodology to set their prices. The market is characterised by asymmetry of information and a high proportion...

In this article we analyse the market for drugs in health care markets where third payers (an insurance company or a government agency) bear the cost and we suggest a common and transparent methodology to set the price for new drugs as well as active principles for which an alternative already...

Drug price regulation is acquiring increasing significance in the investment choices of the pharmaceutical sector. The overall objective is to determine an optimal trade-off between the incentives for innovation, consumer protection, and value for money. However, price regulation is itself a...

Patient mobility is a key issue in the EU who recently passed a new law on patients’ right to EU-wide provider choice. In this paper we use a Hotelling model with two regions that differ in technology to study the impact of patient mobility on health care quality, health care financing and...

The paper studies the incentive for providers to invest in new health care technologies under alternative payment systems, when the patients' benefits are uncertain. If the reimbursement by the purchaser includes both a variable (per patient) and a lump-sum component, efficiency can be ensured...

Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) cause about 71% of all deaths globally and a considerable increase in health care costs. To tackle this problem, several Governments have designed "sin taxes", i.e, extra payments related to the quantity of unhealthy contents of specific goods. However, unhealthy...

This paper aims to characterise a dynamic, incentive-compatible contract for the provision of health services, allowing for both moral hazard and adverse selection. Patients' severity changes over time following a stochastic process and is private information of the provider. We characterise the...

The paper studies the incentive for providers to invest in new health care technologies under alternative payment systems, when the patients' benefits are uncertain. If the reimbursement by the purchaser includes both a variable (per patient) and a lump-sum component, efficiency can be ensured...