This paper aims to characterise a dynamic, incentive-compatible contract for the provision of health services, allowing for both moral hazard and adverse selection. Patients' severity changes over time following a stochastic process and is private information of the provider. We characterise the...

The paper studies the incentive for providers to invest in new health care technologies under alternative payment systems, when the patients' benefits are uncertain. If the reimbursement by the purchaser includes both a variable (per patient) and a lump-sum component, efficiency can be ensured...

The paper uses a real option approach to investigate the potential impact of performance-based risk-sharing agreements for the reimbursement of new drugs in comparison with standard cost-effectiveness thresholds. The results show that the exact definition of the risk-sharing agreement is key in...

The paper studies the impact of alternative reimbursement systems on two provider decisions: whether to adopt a technology whose provision requires a sunk investment cost and how many patients to treat with it. Using a simple economic model we show that the optimal pricing policy involves a...

The paper studies the incentive for providers to invest in new health care technologies under alternative payment systems, when the patients' benefits are uncertain. If the reimbursement by the purchaser includes both a variable (per patient) and a lump-sum component, efficiency can be ensured...

In this paper we investigate the relationship between the DRG system for hospital reimbursement and investment in technologies. We use a simple economic model where the reimbursement policy for treatments whose provision requires a sunk investment cost has an impact on both the decision whether...

In this paper we use a simple theoretical model to compare alternative regulation regimes for the reimbursement of medical innovations when responses to a new treatment (effectiveness) are heterogeneous within the eligible population. We study two dimensions: i) efficiency in selecting...

The paper studies the incentive for providers to invest in new health care technologies under alternative payment systems, when the patients' benefits are uncertain. If the reimbursement by the purchaser includes both a variable (per patient) and a lump-sum component, efficiency can be ensured...