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Does procedural fairness crowd out other-regarding concerns? A bidding experiment
Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo - 2010
Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario for other-regarding concerns. The two-by-two factorial design...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281671
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Does Procedural Fairness Crowd Out Other-Regarding Concerns? A Bidding Experiment
Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo - In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 169 (2013) 3, pp. 433-450
Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. Here, we investigate procedural fairness as in Güth (2011). In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010903173
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Does procedural fairness crowd out other-regarding concerns? A bidding experiment
Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario for other-regarding concerns. The two-by-two factorial design...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008670333
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Voluntary contributions with risky and uncertain marginal returns: the importance of the minimal value
Levati, M. Vittoria; Morone, Andrea - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
contributions. This paper presents experimental results illustrating that the effects of risk and uncertainty depend on the employed … efficiency gains, the presence of risk and uncertainty about the public good's value is not detrimental to cooperation. This … ?nding casts doubt on the hypothesis that risk and uncertainty, per se, weaken people's willingness to contribute. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964131
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Public projects benefiting some and harming others: Three experimental studies
Güth, Werner; Koukoumelis, Anastasios; Levati, M. Vittoria - 2012
Based on an axiomatically derived provision rule allowing community members to endogenously determine which, if any, public project should be provided, we perform experiments where (i) not all parties benefit from provision, and (ii) the projects' costs can be negative. In the tradition of legal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291800
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Paternalism with hindsight do protégés react consequentialistically to paternalism?
Kataria, Mitesh; Levati, M. Vittoria; Uhl, Matthias - 2012
We investigate experimentally whether the protégés' reaction to paternalism depends on the consequences of the paternalistic action to their well-being. We find that protégé punish a paternalist restricting their freedom of choice. Yet, this negative reaction is not based on principled...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291822
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Cooperation in a risky environment: Decisions from experience in a stochastic social dilemma
Artinger, Florian; Fleischhut, Nadine; Levati, M. Vittoria - 2012
cooperation is shaped by the way information about risk is presented (from description or from experience) and by differences in … lotteries with equivalent levels of risk. Cooperation rates in games vary with different levels of risk across decision … situations with the same expected outcomes, thereby mimicking behavior in lotteries. Risk presentation, however, only affected …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291829
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Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence
Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria - 2009
In a duopoly market, aspiration levels express how much sellers want to earn given their expectations about the other's behavior. We augment the sellers' decision task by eliciting their profit aspiration. In a first experimental phase, whenever satisficing is not possible, sales choices, point...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294797
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Procedurally fair collective provision: Its requirements and experimental functionality
Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Koukoumelis, Anastasios; … - 2013
This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects provision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects´ costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323883
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Providing negative cost public projects under a fair mechanism: An experimental analysis
Güth, Werner; Koukoumelis, Anastasios; Levati, M. Vittoria - 2013
This paper experimentally examines a procedurally fair provision mechanism allowing members of a small community to determine, via their bids, which of four alternative public projects to implement. Previous experiments with positive cost projects have demonstrated that the mechanism is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323901