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Does procedural fairness crowd out other-regarding concerns? A bidding experiment
Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo - 2010
Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario for other-regarding concerns. The two-by-two factorial design...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281671
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Does Procedural Fairness Crowd Out Other-Regarding Concerns? A Bidding Experiment
Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo - In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 169 (2013) 3, pp. 433-450
Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. Here, we investigate procedural fairness as in Güth (2011). In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010903173
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Does procedural fairness crowd out other-regarding concerns? A bidding experiment
Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario for other-regarding concerns. The two-by-two factorial design...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008670333
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Voluntary contributions with risky and uncertain marginal returns: the importance of the minimal value
Levati, M. Vittoria; Morone, Andrea - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
contributions. This paper presents experimental results illustrating that the effects of risk and uncertainty depend on the employed … efficiency gains, the presence of risk and uncertainty about the public good's value is not detrimental to cooperation. This … ?nding casts doubt on the hypothesis that risk and uncertainty, per se, weaken people's willingness to contribute. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964131
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Satisficing in strategic environments:a theoretical approach and experimental evidence
Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2008
The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games.Based on direct elicitation of aspirations, we formally define the conceptof satisficing, which does not exclude (prior-free) optimality but includesit as a border case. We also review some experiments on strategic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866442
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Satisficing and prior-free optimality in price competition:a theoretical and experimental analysis
Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2008
On a heterogeneous experimental oligopoly market, sellers choose a price,specify a set-valued prior-free conjecture about the others' behavior, andform their own profit-aspiration for each element of their conjecture. Weformally define the concepts of satisficing and prior-free optimality...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866446
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Social identity and trust - An experimental investigation
Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006
We experimentally examine how group identity affects trust behaviorin an investment game. In one treatment, group identity isinduced purely by minimal groups. In other treatments, group membersare additionally related by outcome interdependence establishedin a prior public goods game. Moving...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866633
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Leading by example with and without exclusionpower in voluntary contribution experiments
Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Sutter, Matthias; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006
We examine the effects of leading by example in voluntary contributionexperiments. Leadership is implemented by letting one group membercontribute to the public good before followers do. Such leadershipincreases contributions in comparison to the standard voluntary contributionmechanism,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866642
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Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence
Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006
In a stochastic duopoly market, sellers must form state-specific aspirationsexpressing how much they want to earn given their expectationsabout the other's behavior. We define individually and mutually satisficingsales behavior for given individual beliefs and aspiration profiles. In afirst...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866647
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Voluntary contributions with imperfect information:An experimental study
Fiore, Annamaria; Levati, M. Vittoria; Morone, Andrea - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006
examine the effect of imperfect information on contributions levels. To assess prior risk attitudes, individual valuations of … clear evidence of risk aversion, and of a negative relationship between the latter and willingness to cooperate. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866650