In a repeated game with imperfect public information, the set of equilibria depends on the way that the distribution of public signals varies with the players' actions. Recent research has focused on the case of “frequent monitoring,†where the time interval between periods becomes...

We examine games played by a single large player and a large number of opponents who are small, but not anonymous. If the play of the small players is observed with noise, and if the number of actions the large player controls is bounded as the number of small players grows, the equilibrium set...

We study a variation of fictitious play, in which the probability of each action is an exponential function of that action's utility against the historical frequency of opponents' play. Regardless of the opponents' strategies, the utility received by an agent using this rule is nearly the best...

We comment on the Shoham, Powers, and Grenager survey of multi-agent learning and game theory, emphasizing that some of their categories are important for economics and others are not. We also try to correct some minor imprecisions in their discussion of the economics literature on learning in...

We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibria of a game to arise as limits of ε-equilibria of games with smaller strategy spaces. As the smaller games are frequently more tractable, our result facilitates the characterization of the set of equilibria.

In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to deviations. This paper develops a refinement of self-confirming equilibrium in which players use...