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~person:"Levine, David K."
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Game theory
7
Spieltheorie
7
Theorie
5
Theory
5
Bayes-Statistik
4
Bayesian inference
4
Learning process
4
Lernprozess
4
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Decision under uncertainty
1
Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit
1
Greenberg works in an extensive-form context
1
Kreps and Levine (1987)
1
Risiko
1
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1
Rubinstein and Wolinksy consider strategic-form games and general "signal fictions". We should make clear from the outset that
1
Strategic management
1
Strategisches Management
1
a key issue is what sort of prior itiormation about payoffs should be considered. It is well known that predictions based on common certainty of payoffs are not robust to even a small amount of uncertainty. Following Fudenberg
1
although this paper is motivated by the learning-theoretic approach to equilibrium in games
1
and players observe only the outcomes in their own matches
1
and that this difference corresponds to the distinction between SCE and RSCE.8 Papers by Rubinstein and Wolinksy [1994] and Greenberg [1994]
1
are based on the idea that players form their forecasts of opponents play using prior information both about the opponents' payoffs and about the realized outcomes when the game is played. Both these papers
1
as it is not in most experiments
1
both in the real world and in the laboratory
1
but it is consistent with an (approximate
1
but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to deviations. Intuitively
1
but we have not checked the details
1
by the last few rounds of the experiment the first movers had stopped contributing
1
consider common certainty of rationality
1
each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path
1
each time the game is played
1
for example
1
heterogeneous) SCE (Fudenberg and Levine [1996] 7 ). Thus these experiments provide evidence that information about other players' payoffs makes a difference
1
in addition to almost common certainty of the payoffs
1
in section 4 we show that it does correspond to assuming almost common certainty of payoffs and independence. To capture the idea of SCE
1
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Levine, David K.
Scotchmer, Suzanne
351
Dekel, Eddie
134
Dekel-Tabak, Eddie
80
Fudenberg, Drew
54
Maurer, Stephen M.
31
Lipman, Barton L.
30
Wolinsky, Asher
30
Morris, Stephen
25
Rustichini, Aldo
23
Grodal, Birgit
19
Jackson, Matthew O.
19
Ellickson, Bryan
18
Schankerman, Mark
17
Brandenburger, Adam
16
Erkal, Nisvan
14
Feinberg, Yossi
13
Piccione, Michele
13
Thisse, Jacques-François
13
Scotchmer, S.
11
Zame, William R.
11
Dekel, E.
9
Green, Jerry R.
9
Ben-Porath, Elchanan
8
Farrell, Joseph
8
SCOTCHMER, Suzanne
8
Engl, Greg
7
Park, Yooki
7
Jehiel, Philippe
6
O'Donoghue, Ted
6
Rausser, Gordon C.
6
THISSE, Jacques-François
6
Yilankaya, Okan
6
Gilles, Robert Paul
5
SCOTCHMER, S.
5
Simon, Leo K.
5
Slemrod, Joel
5
Wooders, Myrna Holtz
5
Diamantaras, Dimitrios
4
Ely, Jeffrey C.
4
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ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution (ELSE), Department of Economics
2
Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (CMS-EMS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management
1
David K. Levine
1
Harvard Institute of Economic Research
1
Harvard Institute of Economic Research (HIER), Department of Economics
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Journal of economic theory
4
Discussion paper series / Harvard Institute of Economic Research
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ELSE working papers
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Games and economic behavior
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Journal of Economic Theory
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Discussion Papers / Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (CMS-EMS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management
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Discussion paper / Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University
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Games and Economic Behavior
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Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
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Levine's Working Paper Archive
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ECONIS (ZBW)
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EconStor
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1
Sujective uncertainty over behavior strategies : a correction
Dekel-Tabak, Eddie
;
Fudenberg, Drew
;
Levine, David K.
- In:
Journal of economic theory
104
(
2002
)
2
,
pp. 473-478
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001685429
Saved in:
2
Learning to play Bayesian games
Dekel-Tabak, Eddie
(
contributor
); …
-
2001
-
[Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001794322
Saved in:
3
Learning to play Bayesian games
Dekel-Tabak, Eddie
;
Fudenberg, Drew
;
Levine, David K.
- In:
Games and economic behavior
46
(
2004
)
2
,
pp. 282-303
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001889620
Saved in:
4
Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
Dekel-Tabak, Eddie
;
Fudenberg, Drew
;
Levine, David K.
- In:
Journal of economic theory
89
(
1999
)
2
,
pp. 165-185
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001436015
Saved in:
5
Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
Dekel-Tabak, Eddie
;
Fudenberg, Drew
;
Levine, David K.
-
1996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000946216
Saved in:
6
Learning to play Bayesian games
Dekel-Tabak, Eddie
;
Fudenberg, Drew
;
Levine, David K.
-
2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001652615
Saved in:
7
Learning to Play Bayesian Games
Dekel, Eddie
;
Fudenberg, Drew
;
Levine, David K.
-
2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236130
Saved in:
8
Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
Dekel, Eddie
;
Fudenberg, Drew
;
Levine, David K.
-
1999
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001369816
Saved in:
9
Learning to play Bayesian games
Dekel, Eddie
;
Fudenberg, Drew
;
Levine, David K.
- In:
Games and economic behavior
46
(
2004
)
2
,
pp. 282-303
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008215012
Saved in:
10
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium
Dekel, Eddie
;
Fudenberg, Drew
;
Levine, David K.
- In:
Journal of economic theory
89
(
1999
)
2
,
pp. 165-185
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007682745
Saved in:
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