Showing 1 - 8 of 8
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003717025
We model electoral competition between two parties in a winner-take-all election. Parties choose strategically first their platforms and then their campaign spending under aggregate uncertainty about voters' preferences. We use the model to examine why campaign spending in the United States has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005306815
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007911150
We model electoral competition between two parties in a winner take all election. Parties choose strategically first their platforms and then their campain spending under aggregate uncertainty about voters' preferences. In the unique Nash equilibrium larger elections are characterized by a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328928
We model electoral competition between two parties in a winner-take-all election. Parties choose strategically first their platforms and then their campaign spending under aggregate uncertainty about voters' preferences. We use the model to examine why campaign spending in the United States has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005151244
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001235750
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007696700
We argue that standard models of voting do a bad job explaining the frequency of very close mass elections with high turnout. We instead model head-to-head elections as a competition between incentive schemes to turn out voters and elucidate conditions under which parties might prefer close...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014471285