We study relative preferences in a general equilibrium model where households make social comparisons and/or get habituated to levels of labour-effort they supply and goods they consume. Bayesian estimations for the US support the existence of a society based on such preferences. In particular,...

How does informality in emerging economies affect the conduct of monetary policy? To answer this question we construct a two-sector, formal-informal new Keynesian closed-economy. The informal sector is more labour intensive, is untaxed, has a classical labour market, faces high credit...

Dynamic principal-agent settings with asymmetric information but no commitment are well known to create a ratchet effect. Here, the most efficient agents must be provided with extra 'information rent' as an incentive to relinquish their informational advantage over an uninformed principal; this...

A New-Keynesian model with deep habits and optimal monetary policy delivers a fiscal multiplier above one and the crowding-in effect on private consumption obtainable in a Real Business Cycle model à la Ravn et al. (2006). Optimized Taylor-type or price-level interest rate rules yield...

We examine the performance of forward-looking inflation-forecast-based rules in open economies. In a New Keynesian two-bloc model, a methodology first employed by Batini and Pearlman (2002) is used to obtain analytically the feedback parameters/horizon pairs associated with unique and stable...

Using a New-Keynesian flexi-price model with external habit formation in consumption and labor supply, we identify the channels underlying the Easterlin Paradox (or “Happiness Inertia”, its generalization). These include whether external habit formation is in “difference” or “ratio”...

We consider two aspects of the commitment problem in price regulation with lobbying the ratchet effect and the hold-up problem. We set out a dynamic model of price regulation with asymmetric information where the regulated firm can ‘buy influence’ in a lobbying equilibrium. Firms can sink...

This note reassesses the basic result in Mukhopadhaya (2003) that, when jurors may acquire costly signals about a defendant’s guilt, with a larger jury size the probability of reaching a correct verdict may in fact fall, contrary to the Condorcet Jury Theorem. We show that if the jurors...

This paper explores the similarity of the underlying economic problems that lead to the establishment of (a) independent central banks to operate national monetary policies and (b) independent regulatory agencies for telecommunications and other utility service industries. We show that, in both...