This paper studies the aggregate consequences of individual learning in the labor market. Specifically, I examine this issue in a model of directed search on the job. Once matched, a firm-worker pair gradually learns the match-specific quality, taking the history of realized production as...

We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive...

We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders and we investigate its properties. Budget...

We present a dynamic signaling model where wasteful education takes place over several periods of time. Workers pay an education cost per unit of time and cannot commit to a fixed education length. Workers face an exogenous dropout risk before graduation. Since low-productivity workers' cost is...

We consider the impact of job rotation in a directed search model in which firm sizes are endogenously determined and match quality is initially unknown. A large firm benefits from the opportunity of rotating workers so as to partially overcome loss of mismatch. As a result, in the unique...

We consider Coasian bargaining problems where the buyer has an outside option arriving at a stochastic time. We study both observable outside option models and unobservable outside option models. In both models, we show that a Coasian equilibrium exists if (1) the arrival of the outside option...

This paper analyzes a dynamic education signaling model with dropout risk. Workers pay an education cost per unit of time and face an exogenous dropout risk before graduation. Since low-productivity workers’ cost of education is high, pooling with early dropouts helps them avoid a high...

We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive...

This paper studies the dynamics of workers. on-the-job search behavior and its consequences in an equilibrium labor market. In a model with both directed search and learning about the match quality of firm-worker pairs, I highlight the job search target effect of learning: as a worker updates...

We study dynamic bargaining with uncertainty over the buyer's valuation and the seller's outside option. A long-lived seller makes offers to a long-lived buyer whose value is private information. There may exist a short-lived buyer whose value is higher than that of the long-lived buyer. The...