We enrich a cheap-talk game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver by adding repeated interactions and voluntary transfer payments. Transfers play two roles here: they motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full separation can always...

We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision‐making and signal the sender's information. Although full separation can always be supported in equilibrium,...

We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver’s decision-making and signal the sender’s information. Although full separation can always be supported in equilibrium,...

We enrich the Crawford and Sobel (1982) model of strategic communication between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver by adding repeated interactions and voluntary transfer payments. Transfers play two roles here: they incentivise decision-making and signal information. Although full...

This paper shows that top management structures in large US firms radically changed since the mid-1980s. While the number of managers reporting directly to the CEO doubled, the growth was driven primarily by functional managers rather than general managers. Using panel data on senior management...

This paper shows that top management structures in large US firms radically changed since the mid-1980s. While the number of managers reporting directly to the CEO doubled, the growth was driven primarily by functional managers rather than general managers. Using panel data on senior management...

Top management structures in large US firms have changed significantly since the mid-1980s. While the size of the executive team — the group of managers reporting directly to the CEO — doubled during this period, this growth was driven primarily by an increase in functional managers rather...