In this note we link the solutions for multi-choice games proposed by Hsiao and Raghavan (1992), Derks and Peters (1993), and Peters and Zank (2005) with the Shapley values of some particular TU games.

In this note we show that on the domain of fuzzy NTU games whose core is non-empty, the core is the only solution satisfying non-emptiness, individual rationality and the reduced game property.

The main focus of this paper is on the restricted Shapley value for multi-choice games introduced by Derks and Peters [Derks, J., Peters, H., 1993. A Shapley value for games with restricted coalitions. International Journal of Game Theory 21, 351-360] and studied by Klijn et al. [Klijn, F.,...

In this note we link the solutions for multi-choice games proposed by Hsiao and Raghavan (1992), Derks and Peters (1993), and Peters and Zank (2005) with the Shapley values of some particular TU games.

In this note we show that on the domain of fuzzy NTU games whose core is non-empty, the core is the only solution satisfying non-emptiness, individual rationality and the reduced game property.