-term contracts. We argue that only if the parties to a unitization contract have unit production shares that are the same as their … cost shares will the contract be incentive compatible. Using a data base of sixty unit operating agreements, we measure the … desirable contract rules for avoiding moral hazard. It also shows how the effects of those rules can be replicated in difficult …

-term contracts. We argue that only if the parties to a unitization contract have unit production shares that are the same as their … cost shares will the contract be incentive compatible. Using a database of 60 unit operating agreements, we measure the … contract rules for avoiding moral hazard. It also shows how the effects of those rules can be replicated in difficult …

-term contracts. We argue that only if the parties to a unitization contract have unit production shares that are the same as their … cost shares will the contract be incentive compatible. Using a data base of sixty unit operating agreements, we measure the … desirable contract rules for avoiding moral hazard. It also shows how the effects of those rules can be replicated in difficult …

-term contracts. We argue that only if the parties to a unitization contract have unit production shares that are the same as their … cost shares will the contract be incentive compatible. Using a data base of sixty unit operating agreements, we measure the … desirable contract rules for avoiding moral hazard. It also shows how the effects of those rules can be replicated in difficult …