Building on two sources of exogenous shocks to analyst coverage – broker closures and mergers, we explore the causal effects of analyst coverage on mitigating managerial expropriation of outside shareholders. We find that as a firm experiences an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage,...

Building on two sources of exogenous shocks to analyst coverage (broker closures and mergers), we explore the causal effects of analyst coverage on mitigating managerial expropriation of outside shareholders. We find that as a firm experiences an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage,...

In this paper, we evaluate the effect of managerial entrenchment on corporate information production using the voting outcomes of shareholder-initiated proposals intended to mitigate managerial entrenchment. We focus on the proposals that are passed or rejected by a small margin of votes, which...

This article examines the impact of the divergence between corporate insiders' control rights and cash-flow rights on firms' external finance constraints via generalized method of moments estimation of an investment Euler equation. Using a large sample of U.S. firms during the 1994–2002...

This article identifies an important channel through which excess control rights affect firm value. Using a new, hand-collected data set on corporate ownership and control of 3,468 firms in 22 countries during the 1996–2008 period, we find that the cost of debt financing is significantly...

This paper examines the incentive effects of a mandatory personal deductible in liability insurance contracts for directors and officers (D&Os). Exploiting a novel German law that mandates personal deductibles for executives, we document positive returns for affected firms around the first...

This paper studies the real effect of a major RegTech event - the staggered implementation of the SEC's EDGAR system in 1993-1996. This event represents an exogenous shock to corporate information dissemination technologies, which leads to a considerable reduction in information acquisition...

We provide evidence concerning the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions and outcomes for different types of mergers: vertical, horizontal, and diversifying. Using chief executive officer (CEO) relative inside leverage to proxy for the incentives...

We identify “anchoring CEOs” based on whether CEOs' insider trading anchors on their firms' 52-week highs. We hypothesize that these CEOs imprint anchoring heuristic for personal decision-making on corporate decisions of similar nature, i.e., equity trading. We find that firms with anchoring...

While practitioners call for long-term managerial compensation to promote firms’ commitment in environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues, little direct evidence exists on the role managerial incentive horizon plays in firms’ ESG performance. Exploiting two alternative identification...