We extend implementation theory by allowing the social choice function to depend on more than just the profile of preferences of the agents and by allowing agents to support their statements with hard evidence. We show that a simple condition on the evidence structure which is necessary for the...

We study the random Strotz model, a version of the Strotz (1955) model with uncer- tainty about the nature of the temptation that will strike. We show that the random Strotz representation is unique and characterize a comparative notion of \more temp- tation averse." Also, we demonstrate an...

This survey discusses decision{theoretic models of agents who seek to constrain and regulate their own future behavior. The common theme is that the decision makers' future utility is affected by unwanted temptations. The wish to eliminate temptations from future option sets creates a preference...

Lipman [2003] shows that in a finite model, the common prior assumption has weak implications for finite orders of beliefs about beliefs. In particular, the only such implications are those stemming from the weaker assumption of a common support. To explore the role of the finite model...

We extend implementation theory by allowing the social choice function to depend on more than just the prole of preferences of the agents and by allowing agents to support their statements with hard evidence. We show that a simple condition on the evidence structure which is necessary for the...

We show that small switching costs can have surprisingly dramatic effects in infinitely repeated games if these costs are large relative to payoffs in a single period. This shows that the results in Lipman and Wang [2000] do have analogs in the case of infinitely repeated games. We also discuss...

“My own behavior baffles me. For I find myself not doing what I really want to do but doing what I really loathe.” Saint Paul What behavior can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent faces temptation but is otherwise a “standard rational agent”? In earlier work,...

We show that small switching costs can have surprisingly dramatic effects in infinitely repeated games if these costs are large relative to payoffs in a single period. This shows that the results in Lipman and Wang [2000] do have analogs in the case of infinitely repeated games. We also discuss...

“My own behavior baffles me. For I find myself not doing what I really want to do but doing what I really loathe.” Saint Paul What behavior can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent faces temptation but is otherwise a “standard rational agent”? In earlier work,...