We show that in a class of I‐agent mechanism design problems with evidence, commitment is unnecessary, randomization has no value, and robust incentive compatibility has no cost. In particular, for each agent i, we construct a simple disclosure game between the...

My own behavior baffles me. For I find myself not doing what I really want to do but doing what I really loathe." Saint Paul What behavior can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent faces temptation but is otherwise a standard rational agent"? In earlier work, GulPesendorfer [2001] use...

My own behavior baffles me. For I find myself not doing what I really want to do but doing what I really loathe.ʺ Saint Paul What behavior can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent faces temptation but is otherwise a standard rational agentʺ? In earlier work, GulPesendorfer [2001]...