Debreu and Scarf (Int Econ Rev 4:235–246, <CitationRef CitationID="CR9">1963</CitationRef>) proved that for an exchange economy or a production economy with the same production set for all coalitions, under some standard assumptions, an Edgeworth equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium, and Florenzano (J Math Anal Appl 153:18–36, <CitationRef...</citationref></citationref>

In 2004, Predtetchinski and Herings [A. Predtetchinski, P.J.J. Herings, “A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game”, Journal of Economic Theory 116 (2004) 84–92] provided a necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of...

This article contends that cooperative games have been studied extensively in the literature. A central question in cooperative games is to study solution concepts and their relationships, those well-known solution concepts include cores, stable sets, Shapley values, bargaining sets, and so on....