Theoretical and empirical studies argue that managerial hoarding of negative firm-specific information can result in large negative stock price corrections once the accumulated information is revealed. A managerial labor market with tournament-like progression provides managers with the...

Building on recent theory, we find strong and robust evidence that external labor market incentives motivate CEOs to adopt more aggressive tax policies in order to improve firm performance and their own labor market value. In addition, we find that the tax aggressiveness-labor market incentives...

We explore the possibility that SEC oversight influences disclosure practices in a manner that reduces the likelihood of individual stock price crashes. Firms located farther from the SEC have greater stock price crash risk and this result is more pronounced for firms with financial statements...

Theory suggests that inside debt held by executives in the form of deferred compensation and unfunded pensions serves to align management incentives with creditors, thereby incentivizing them to act more conservatively. Evidence in the literature suggests that creditors favor less aggressive tax...

We exploit pension funding relief enacted in 2012 to estimate the effects of a positive shock to internal liquidity on market prices and investment. Measuring unexpected increases in internal liquidity using a priori expected pension contributions disclosed under FAS132R, we report positive...

We find evidence suggesting that corporate lobbying for tax purposes over the period 1999-2009 is one method by which firms managed corporate taxes. Furthermore, tax management strategies employed by these politically active firms were valued by shareholders. Firms lobbying on tax issues have...