<Para ID="Par1">In this paper sequencing situations with Just-in-Time (JiT) arrival are introduced. This new type of one-machine sequencing situations assumes that a job is available to be handled by the machine as soon as its predecessor is finished. A basic predecessor dependent set-up time is incorporated in...</para>

For games with a non-empty core the Alexia value is introduced, a value which averages the lexicographic maxima of the core. It is seen that the Alexia value coincides with the Shapley value for convex games, and with the nucleolus for strongly compromise admissible games and big boss games. For...

This paper revisits the Alexia value, a recent solution concept for cooperative transferable utility games. We introduce the dual Alexia value and show that it coincides with the Alexia value for several classes of games. We demonstrate the importance of the notion of compromise stability for...

In this paper preparation sequencing situations are introduced. This new type of one-machine sequencing situations assumes that before a job can start, some preparation depending on its predecessor is required. Preparation sequencing situations are first analyzed from an operations research...

To verify whether a transferable utility game is exact, one has to check a linear inequality for each exact balanced collection of coalitions. This paper studies the structure and properties of the class of exact balanced collections. Comparing the definition of exact balanced collections with...

To verify whether a transferable utility game is exact, one has to check a linear inequality for each exact balanced collection of coalitions. This paper studies the structure and properties of the class of exact balanced collections. Comparing the definition of exact balanced collections with...