Showing 1 - 10 of 58
Agents are farsighted when they consider the ultimate results to which their own actions may lead to. We re-examine the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting with transfers where farsighted coalitions are regarded as fundamental behavioral units and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014105813
Behavioral implementation studies implementation when agents' choices need not be rational. All existing papers of this literature, however, fail to handle a large class of choice behaviors because they rely on a well-known condition called Unanimity. This condition says, roughly speaking, that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014551784
Rotation programs are widely used in societies. Some examples are job rotations, rotation schemes in the management of common-pool resources, and rotation procedures in fair division problems. We study rotation programs via the implementation of Pareto efficient social choice rules under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012605973
This study experimentally evaluates the performance of partial equilibrium mechanisms when different sectors run their mechanisms separately, despite the existence of complementarity between them. In our simple laboratory experiment setting that includes two sectors, each sector runs the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012793779
We study rotation programs within the standard implementation framework under complete information. A rotation program is a myopic stable set whose states are arranged circularly, and agents can effectively move only between two consecutive states. We provide characterizing conditions for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013394373
This paper investigates the robustness of Dutta and Sen's (2012) Theorem 1 to weaker notions of truth-telling. An individual honesty standard is modeled as a subgroup of the society, including the individual herself, for which she feels truth-telling concerns. An individual i is honest when she...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011788910
Consider a society with a finite number of sectors (social issues or commodities). In a partial equilibrium (PE) mechanism a sector authority (SA) aims to elicit agents' preference rankings for outcomes at hand, presuming separability of preferences, while such presumption is false in general...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012970262
An individual may display an honesty standard which allows her to lie a little without that being harmful to her self view as an honest person. On this basis, the paper considers a society with a finite number of individuals involving partially-honest individuals and in which every individual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013009451
Rotation programs are widely used in societies. Some examples are job rotations, rotation schemes in the management of common-pool resources, and rotation procedures in fair division problems. We study rotation programs via the implementation of Pareto efficient social choice rules under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012519973
This study experimentally evaluates the performance of partial equilibrium mechanisms when different sectors run their mechanisms separately, despite the existence of complementarity between them. In our simple laboratory experiment setting that includes two sectors, each sector runs the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012604034