Showing 1 - 10 of 52
Behavioral implementation studies implementation when agents' choices need not be rational. All existing papers of this literature, however, fail to handle a large class of choice behaviors because they rely on a well-known condition called Unanimity. This condition says, roughly speaking, that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014551784
, for multi-valued rules, our notion of rotation monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Finally, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012605973
This study experimentally evaluates the performance of partial equilibrium mechanisms when different sectors run their mechanisms separately, despite the existence of complementarity between them. In our simple laboratory experiment setting that includes two sectors, each sector runs the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012793779
We study rotation programs within the standard implementation framework under complete information. A rotation program is a myopic stable set whose states are arranged circularly, and agents can effectively move only between two consecutive states. We provide characterizing conditions for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013394373
We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies with free-disposal (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) where agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). Firstly, the Walrasian rule is shown to be non-implementable where all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457041
We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies when agents have intrinsic preferences for responsibility. An agent has an intrinsic preference for responsibility if she cares about truth-telling that is in line with the goal of the mechanism designer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011788908
condition for Nash implementation, called partial-honesty monotonicity, and shows that in an independent domain of preferences … that condition is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011788910
A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you do not have to" to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of n Ï 3 individuals, a social choice rule (SCR)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011788918
behavior of agents always coincides with the recommendation given by a social choice rule. We show that (Maskin) monotonicity … fully identifies the class of implementable single-valued social choice rules. Even though, monotonicity is not necessary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503093
We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies with free-disposal (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) where agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). Firstly, the Walrasian rule is shown to be non-implementable where all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010426591