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condition of monotonicity is no longer required, whereas a weak version of the standard punishment condition is required even …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015225060
This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent new trend of implementation theory which incorporates a non-consequentialist flavor of the evidence from experimental and behavioral economics into the issues. Specifically, following the seminal works by Matsushima (2008) and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015225628
We study rotation programs within the standard implementation framework under complete information. A rotation program is a myopic stable set whose states are arranged circularly, and agents can effectively move only between two consecutive states. We provide characterizing conditions for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013394373
Behavioral implementation studies implementation when agents' choices need not be rational. All existing papers of this literature, however, fail to handle a large class of choice behaviors because they rely on a well-known condition called Unanimity. This condition says, roughly speaking, that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014551784
) monotonicity fully identifies the class of social choice functions that are implementable by a rights structure. We also discuss …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015264273
Given the framework introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012), this paper offers a comprehensive analysis of (Nash) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015237760
In this paper, we introduce the weak and the strong notions of partially honest agents (Dutta and Sen, 2012), and then study implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) in pure exchange economies with three or more agents in which pure-consequentialistically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015237787
We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies with free-disposal (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) where agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). Firstly, the Walrasian rule is shown to be non-implementable where all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457041
We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies when agents have intrinsic preferences for responsibility. An agent has an intrinsic preference for responsibility if she cares about truth-telling that is in line with the goal of the mechanism designer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011788908
condition for Nash implementation, called partial-honesty monotonicity, and shows that in an independent domain of preferences … that condition is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011788910