Following surprise independent director departures, affected firms have worse stock and operating performance, are more likely to restate earnings, face shareholder litigation, suffer from an extreme negative return event, and make worse mergers and acquisitions. The announcement returns to...

Outside directors have incentives to resign to protect their reputation or to avoid an increase in their workload when they anticipate that the firm on whose board they sit will perform poorly or disclose adverse news. We call these incentives the dark side of outside directors. We find strong...

Following surprise independent director departures, affected firms have worse stock and operating performance, are more likely to restate earnings, face shareholder litigation, suffer from an extreme negative return event, and make worse mergers and acquisitions. The announcement returns to...

A larger CEO network can reduce the cost of equity by reducing information asymmetry between the firm and outsiders, and by increasing trust between the firm and stakeholders. Alternatively, a larger CEO network can increase the cost of equity because higher CEO connectedness encourages greater...

We find that firms appointing first-time independent directors experience an increase in firm value, especially among firms with well-functioning boards, firms with less powerful CEOs, and non-complex firms. Unlike seasoned independent directors, first-time directors are associated with higher...