Governments play a central role in the allocation of capital and risk in the economy. Evaluating the cost to taxpayers of government investments requires an assumption about the government's cost of capital. Governments often take their borrowing rate to be their cost of capital, which...

When a private pension plan sponsor with an underfunded plan becomes insolvent, the difference between the value of the plan's assets and its termination liabilities represents a liability for the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). Hence, accurately modeling the joint statistical...

In the wake of the financial crisis, the Dodd–Frank Act established the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and the Office of Financial Research (OFR) to address the concern that policymakers lacked sufficient data to anticipate emerging threats to financial stability. Although most...

In this paper we explore the conjecture that the periodic episodes of high prices and constrained supply in the property- casualty industry are the result of temporary capital shortages. We do this by looking for increases in activities aimed at increasing capital at these times: dividend cuts,...

We examine asset prices and consumption patterns in a model in which agents face both aggregate and idiosyncratic income shocks, and insurance markets are incomplete. Agents reduce consumption variability by trading in a stock and bond market to offset idiosyncratic shocks, but transactions...

Early cash-in-advance models have the feature that the cash-in-advance constraint always binds, implying that the velocity of money is constant. Lucas (1984) and Svensson (1985) propose a change in information structure that potentially allows velocity to vary. By calibrating a version of these...

This paper develops a formal model of the timing and pricing of new equity issues, assuming that managers are better informed than new investors about the quality of the firm. Firms will prefer to issue equity when the market is most informed about the quality of the firm. This implies that...

Banks know more about the quality of their assets than do outside investors. This informational asymmetry can distort investment decisions if the bank must raise funds from uninformed outsiders, and assets sold will be subject to a lemons discount. Using a three-period equilibrium model we...

This paper models bank asset choice when shareholders know more about loan quality than do outsiders. Because of this informational asymmetry, the price of loans in the secondary market is the price for poor quality loans. Banks desire to hold marketable securities in order to avoid liquidating...